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Abstract
In its very dynamic essence, a democratic society bears the need for continuous 
reformation and perfection, and that is why the application of reforms represents 
an inseparable feature for this type of society. The consolidation of the rule of law, 
the institutional independence, and the cause of justice itself comprise, inter alia, 
the need for constitutional revision. This study puts forward a theoretical-historical 
comparative view of the relevant and dynamic issue of the institute of constitutional 
revision in the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, as a complex 
process accompanied by limitations on constitutional revision. The historical evolution 
of constitutional drafting, modern constitutions, relevant issues, political and social 
circumstances as well as drafting and adoption procedures, dynamism of constitutions 
to cope with the course of time achieved by revisions for the purpose of their 
stability as well as consolidation of the role of constitutions as a factor that facilitates 
and precedes social development, comprise the pillar of this study addressed in a 
comparative point of view.
Keywords: Constitution; Institute of constitutional revision; Revision limitation 
procedures; International and Albanian experience
Introduction 
In general, the drafting of a constitution is closely related to an important political and 
social event.The legal-political thought on constitutions was a result of the developments 
of the time in relation to the content and purposes of such developments, as well as 
in relation to the evolution of the rule of law and requirements on the separation of 
power.
Addressing the institute of constitutional revision is of a doctrinal importance, expressed 
through the adaptation and coherence of the Constitution with the essential social 
and economic changes of a society. In this context, the address made by this study to 
the institute of revision is aimed at a conceptual and comparative analysis focused in 
the Albanian case, in the light of European standards, identifying the similarities and 
differences between it and the European constitutional jurisprudence.
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Being a complex process, constitutional revision bears specific characteristics in each 
phase of the legislative process as well as limitations. Taking into account the complexity 
of the revision process, the Albanian case is addressed focusing on European effective 
and contemporary experiences.
Constitutional revision as a concept. Content and revision formulas in a 
theoretical-historical comparative aspect 
The concept of constitutional revision was the result of and was conditioned by 
the need to adapt the formal constitution to the dynamism of social life of the 
political-economic system. Differently from the viewpoint of the drafters of the 
first formal constitutions at the end of the 18th century, which generally addressed 
the constitution as inalterable, the concept nowadays focuses on stability rather 
than inalterability of constitutions. The need for adaptation with the development 
dynamism is one of the main reasons why constitutions comprise special provisions 
envisaging procedures for potential amendments. Such a need led the evolution of 
the idea of inalterability of constitutions which was based on the prevailing idea of 
inalterability of the social-political system. A general doctrinaire-historical view on the 
creation of modern conditions and the complex issues which have accompanied and 
engaged human and doctrinaire-historical thought in numerous debates that led to the 
development of constitutional theory, shows that the debates were focused, inter alia, 
mainly on cardinal issues such as superiority, constitutionality, stability, durability, and 
changeability of constitutions. It is these debates which have accompanied the long 
history of constitutions in the continuous process of perfecting the changes they have 
underwent since the beginning to date. It is widely known that modern constitutions 
originate in the 13th century, with the adoption of the Magna Carta Libertatum1, which 
was aimed at the protection of the rights of people in Britain, limiting the power of 
the king. This period of time marks the rising of the legal concept which says that 
“law is to be drafted and passed by the people, while the king only is to promulgate,” 
opening the way to the legal thought of the Britannic tradition on the limitation of the 
power of monarchs. On the other hand, the end of the 18th century is considered as 
the period of the rising of modern constitutions, bringing to the social, political, and 
legal spheres important documents such as: the Constitution of the United States, 17th 
of September 1787; Constitution of the republic of Poland,3rd of May 17912; French 
Constitution, September 1791, which were the result of aspirations of enlightenment, 
freedom of nations and human freedoms, war on anarchy, despotism, arbitrariness, 
intervention of foreign powers, in the end of the 18th century.3
1 The Great Charter of King John the Landless, 1215
2 The second in the world and the first in Europe, even though little has been discussed and written about it 
3 The U.S. Constitution was a result of the war for independence from United Kingdom, the French was a result of revolution, and 
the Polish one was the result of the bloodless changes to ensure the independence of the state and the sovereignty of the nation.
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In the course of time, the concept on the constitution was equalised as an entirety 
of fundamental rules which establish the policy of a country, as a contract, a social 
agreement between the citizens and government officials, which specifies their 
respective rights and serves as fundamental guarantee of the rights of citizens and 
from of power. The Constitution, as the highest fundamental law, is the basis of the 
modern state. It is given a special supreme status, as the source and spirit of the 
entire legislation, and as a result, it provides the grounds for the organisation of the 
work of all bodies of the state and citizens, the grounds of state’s legal order. Any 
law or administrative act which doesn’t comply with the constitution is consequently 
invalid. With the rising and adoption of formal constitutions, different constitutional 
doctrines conceived them differently. However, they all meet in the same idea that 
the Constitution implies the highest sanctioned law of a country, in the formal as well 
as material aspect. These foundations also served as ground for the conception and 
drafting of the current Constitution of the Republic of Albania.4
The constitutional theory provides different opinions, especially on the mutual 
relations between constitutional law and constitutional reality, which implies the 
systematic collection of opinions, theses, and scientific ideas on the creation, stability, 
and amendments of constitutions. This way, the creation of modern constitutions 
was accompanied by the concept of superiority of the constitution in the hierarchical 
system of norms, and as a result, by the principle of constitutionality which became the 
centre of the whole political system. It was not by chance that the political and legal 
though in this period was focused in the superiority and stability of the constitution as 
the foundations of all other norms, the political and legal landscape of the society with 
stable state structures. Superiority and stability are the elements which detach the 
constitution from the daily political developments and even from elected politicians, 
which enables and ensures the stability of the democratic system itself. Therefore, a 
stable constitution ensures that some fundamental structures of the state stay above 
politics and ensure the intangibility of the state system, regardless of the electoral 
results or of the political parties winning the elections. Due to its importance, the 
issues of stability, superiority, and changeability of the constitution have been in the 
focus of a theoretical debate which has accompanied the history of constitutions, 
because on the one hand, the superiority of the constitution is highlighted, but on 
the other hand, in the political point of view, constitutionality considers and identifies 
the constitution as a large social pact. Such debate was materialised and led to the 
drafting of the so called rigid constitutions which envisaged no change or expressively 
4 These principles are identified in the preamble of the Constitution, in the first part, but not only. E.g. we can list Article 
1&1-Albania shall be a Parliamentary Republic; A.2&1- Sovereignty shall belong to the people; A.7- The governance system 
shall be based on the separation and balance of powers; A.15&1- Fundamental human rights and freedoms shall be indivisible, 
unalienable, inviolable, and stand on the foundations of the entire legal order; A.15&2- Public power bodies must respect 
fundamental human rights and freedoms and contribute for their application, etc.
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prohibited their amendment,5 and even if the possibility for aments was envisaged 
they put certain procedural barriers which made it hard to undertake constitutional 
amendments or additions. Their character and essence shows why such constitutions 
were relatively few and their number was limited compared to the constitutions which 
expressively envisaged their amendment and it also shows why they didn’t last long. 
Thus, the stability of the constitution is relative and is not defend and does not derive 
from its inalterability. Constitutions change to adapt to new realities, which cannot be 
foreseen in the time when it is drafted. According to many authors, a constitution is 
not just a legal text or an act of normative rules, but it is also an expression of cultural 
development, means of self-introduction of the people, reflection of cultural heritage, 
and foundation for the future.6 This is the reason why history has known and will 
know constitutions of different types which have gone through processes of change 
led by factors such as theories, different ideas and opinions of philosophers and 
classical authors, political party programs, social experience and development, radical 
evolutions and changes of the systems in the course of time, traditions of respective 
countries and their ancientness, as well as regional and global developments, etc. 
Depending on the aforementioned factors, the revisions made have been general7, 
partial8, or revisions of individual articles.9 In the current reality, constitutions can be 
revised, in certain parts of course, and revision is always made in compliance with the 
provisions envisaged by the effective constitution itself. When it comes to revision, 
there are different types of constitutions, flexible and rigid. Their difference stands in 
the easiness of procedures for their revision. Flexible constitutions provide procedures 
according to which revision is relatively easier compared to rigid constitutions, the 
procedures for the revision of which is qualitatively more difficult. However, whether 
flexible or rigid, a constitution provides guarantee of duration and stability, and as 
a result, it cannot undergo revision according to the will of the political majorities 
coming into power. Therefore, the majority of authors of constitutional law state that 
the revision of the constitution requires maturity and not spontaneity, it requires 
caution and seriousness, while the procedure must be qualitatively different and much 
more complex compared to the process for the amendment of other laws, so for the 
constitution not to become subject of frequent amendments resulting from political 
developments, alternations, or opportunism.
5 The Spanish Constitution of 1912 and the Greek Constitutions of 1911 and 1952 were as such, but they were the only ones to 
expressively prohibit their amendment.
6 See Häbrele, Peter, Der Verfasungsstaat und seine Reformbedürfnisse, in: Christian Meier-Schatz (ed), Die Zukunft des Rechts 
Basel 1999, pg.210.
7 Such are the changes made depending on the transition from one to another social and state organisation system, or radical 
changes from dictatorship to democracy, e.g. Constitution of the Republic of Albania (1998) which sanctioned the new democratic 
system following the collapse of dictatorship in the early 90s 
8 As the constitutional amendments made by the Parliament of Albania on the 21st of April 2008
9 E.g the constitutional amendment made in 2007, Article 154, product of a political agreement for the increase of the number of 
CEC members from 7 to 9, or Article 109/1, regarding the duration of the mandate of the elected local government bodies from 
3 to 4 tears.
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The issue of revision is organically linked with the procedures set forth by the constitution 
itself. The procedure implies a series of acts lined according to some principles, and 
the failure to undertake them consecutively as specified leads to the violation of the 
principle. Nowadays, democratic constitutions specify special conditions, means, 
timeframes, and techniques for their revision. This results in difficulties for the revision 
process because the level of difficulty applied in such revisions, compared to other 
laws, is directly related to democracy and its stability. In the technical-legal aspect, 
such difficulty provides for having a political consensus of a wide majority between 
the parliamentary majority and the opposition when it comes to revisions to the 
constitution, a consensus which must be wider compared to other laws. In this aspect, 
the constitutional revision technique is the specification of the law-making procedure 
through strengthening, augmentation, or addition of conditions, so to make sure the 
agreement of a very wide political majority is indispensable. In the meantime, it is worth 
pointing out that no constitution regulates its general revision. Constitutions provide 
for revision only in certain parts in order to guarantee their stability and duration. 
Moreover, so to preserve their essence even when under revision, constitutions 
expressively and clearly specify the parts which may not undergo revision, which are 
inalterable, thus imposing the so called absolute limitations, or limitations related to 
general principles which represent the grounds of legal order, provisions sanctioning 
fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, of the governance, etc. Such limitations 
are expressively sanctioned in many constitutions, but there are also constitutions, 
such as the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, which do not expressively sanction 
limitations. Such limitations are expressively specified in some constitutions following 
the 2nd World War. Thus, Article 89 of the French Constitution states “The republican 
form of government shall not be the object of an amendment”10. The same stance 
can be found in Article 110&1 of the Constitution of Greece: “The provisions of the 
Constitution shall be subject to revision with the exception of those which determine 
the form of government as a Parliamentary Republic and those of articles 2 paragraph 
1, 4 paragraphs 1, 4 and 7, 5 paragraphs 1 and 3, 13 paragraph 1, and 26.11
Even though the Constitution of the Republic of Albania specifies no explicit statement 
of absolute limitation in any specific article, this doesn’t mean it doesn’t specify 
limitations to revisions. The content of the constitution itself shows there are limitations 
of an absolute type, even though they are not explicitly stated.12 Such conclusion 
derives from the identification and following of the spirit of the constitution as well as 
10 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House,Tirana,1995, pg.79.
11 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana,1995, pgf.149, 80,81,82,86).
12 The following cannot be subjected to amendments: Principles representing the foundations of the state and its governance, 
sanctioned in the first part – Fundamental Principles; fundamental human rights and freedoms which “stand on the foundations 
of the entire legal order,” Article 15; sovereignty of the people Article 2; separation of powers Article 7; independence of the state 
Article 3;pluralism Article 9 etc., because the amendments of these would result in the change of the democratic essence and 
content of state. Therefore, no majority, regardless of number, would be legally justified to make such amendments. 
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constitutional traditions, the preservation of which is very important, and often these 
elements are stronger than an article which explicitly prohibits the revision of certain 
parts of the constitution. In fact, it is not that difficult for politicians to give a formal 
impression that certain constitutional amendments are legal even in cases when they 
go against the Constitution and its spirit. History has also shown cases of existence of 
expressively stated revision limitations which have been bypassed due to instability 
and political opportunism.13
Another important technical element is the setting of timeframes on constitutional 
revision, which was very widely used in the early stages of modern constitutionality 
and it is used even currently. This element is also based on the logical line of 
superiority and stability of the constitution, setting barriers on constitutional revision 
by a temporarily formed parliamentary majority. In this context, the prolongation of 
timeframes is aimed at long reflection on a constitutional revision decision and for it 
to be taken by a wide majority composed of representatives of the people in different 
periods of time, so that the amendments are well-thought, are not casual, and have 
wide cross-legislatures support. Such technique is effective in several democratic 
countries and it is based on the principle of sovereignty of the people as well as on the 
idea of non-exclusion of generations, but their participation in the revision processes. 
E.g. the Constitution of the Netherlands specifies a procedure as follows: publication 
of a revision project voted in the Parliament, dissolution of the two chambers of 
the States General (denomination of the parliament). The new chambers approve 
the revision with a majority of 2/3 of votes.14 Article 112 of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Norway sanctions that the proposal for the amendment of any part of the 
Constitution is to be submitted to the first, second or third Storting (denomination 
of the parliament which is composed by Lagtingand Odelsting) after a new General 
Election and be publicly announced in print. But it shall be left to the first, second 
or third Storting after the following General Election to decide whether or not the 
proposed amendment shall be adopted.
Such amendment must never, however, contradict the principles embodied in the 
Constitution, but solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not 
alter the spirit of the Constitution, and such amendment requires that two thirds of 
the Storting agree thereto.15 Such limitations are also found in the Constitution of 
Greece, in Article 110&2&3 mentioned above.16
13 In the Albanian constitutional history, there is the case of the fall of the Fundamental Statute of the Republic (1925), which 
sanctioned the republican form of the state, replacement with the Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom (1928), which sanctioned 
the Kingdom, even though Article 141 of the Statute of the Republic expressively stated that “the republican form of state may not 
be changed.” For more information see:Aurela Anastasi, “Political institutions and constitutional law in Albania 1912-1939”,Tirana 
1998,Luarasi Publishing House, pg.119-129
14 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1998, pg.93-94
15 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1998, pg.204
16 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.150
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Moreover, constitutions also specify other special rigid procedures for their revision, 
related to rigorously following some well-specified phases for the application of the 
adaptation of a revision, which consist in:- conditions imposed for the initiation of 
a revision, which is different to the law-making initiative;- indispensable quorum 
required to examine a draft-revision, which is different to the one required for the 
examination of ordinary laws; the qualified majority required in the event of revision, 
which is different to the one of ordinary laws; subjection to parliament’s revision 
towards the people’s referendum. 
A better illustration of this is given by the following articles of some constitutions of 
some democratic states as well as procedures envisaged in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Albania.
Article 89 of the Constitution of the French republic sanctions as follows: “The President 
of the Republic, on a proposal by the Prime Minister, and Members of Parliament alike 
shall have the right to initiate amendment of the Constitution. A government or a 
Member’s bill to amend the Constitution shall be passed by the two assemblies… The 
amendment shall have effect after approval by referendum. However, a government 
bill to amend the Constitution shall not be submitted to referendum where the 
President of the Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in Congress; 
the government bill to amend the Constitution shall then be approved only if it is 
adopted by a three-fifths majority of the votes cast… No amendment procedure shall 
be commenced or continued where the integrity of the territory is jeopardized. The 
republican form of government shall not be the object of an amendment.”17 Article 44 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Austria specifies that “Any total revision of the 
Federal Constitution shall upon conclusion of the procedure pursuant to Article 4218, 
but before its authentication by the Federal President be submitted to a referendum 
by the entire nation, whereas any partial revision requires this only if one third of the 
members of the House of Representatives or the Senate so demands 42”.19 Article 
138 of the Constitution of the Republic of Italy specifies that “Laws amending the 
Constitution and other constitutional laws shall be adopted by each House after two 
successive debates at intervals of not less than three months, and shall be approved 
by an absolute majority of the members of each House in the second voting. The 
said laws are submitted to a popular referendum when, within three months of their 
publication, such request is made by one fifth of the members of a House or five 
hundred thousand electors or five region councils. The law submitted to referendum 
shall not be promulgated if not approved by a majority of valid votes.
17 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.79
18 Regards conditions when a law can be deemed authentic and be published 
19 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1998, pg.16
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A referendum shall not be held if the law has been approved in the second voting by 
each of the Houses by a majority of two-thirds of the members”.20 Article 110&2&3&4&6 
of the Constitution of Greece specifies that the need for revision is approved by the 
chamber of MPs with a majority of 3/5 of the members, in two ballots, held at least one 
month apart, the Chamber shall express itself on the matter of revision with absolute 
majority of its members. There is a minimal 5-year timeframe between two revisions.21 
Article 79/2 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, sanctions the 
indispensability of approval in Bundestag and Bundesrat with a majority of 2/3 of each 
chamber.22 Article 5 of the U.S. Constitution envisages that The Congress, whenever 
two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this 
Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several 
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall 
be valid to all intents and purposes, also as part of this Constitution, when ratified by 
the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths 
thereof …, on condition that no amendment made before 1808 does not violate points 
1 and 4 of paragraph 9 of Article 1 as well as no state is stripped of the equal right of vote 
in the Senate without its consent.23Article 131 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia states that decisions to initiate a change in the Constitution is made by the 
Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives and that 
the draft amendment of the Constitution is confirmed by the Assembly by a majority 
vote of the total number of Representativesand then submitted to public debate. 
The decision to change the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the total number of Representatives.24 Articles 154,155, and 158 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria state that the right to a revision initiative 
belongs to 1/4 of the representatives of the people and to the President. The National 
Assembly shall pass any act to amend or supplement the Constitution by a majority of 
three-fourths of all National Representatives, by three votes taken on three different 
days, while the approval of the new Constitution is made by the Grand National 
Assembly25. Articles 136, 137, and 138 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
sanction that the right to propose Constitutional Amendments belongs to 1/5 of the 
members of the Chamber of MP’s, the President of the Republic, and the Government; 
the Chamber of MPs, after receiving an opinion from the Chamber of regions, decides 
on the majority of votes of all MPs whether the amendment is to be made, and the 
20 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.300
21 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.150
22 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.186 -187
23 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.408-409
24 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1998, pg. 176
25 Summary “Constitution,” Albin Publishing House, Tirana 1995, pg.47 
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Chamber of MPs decides on the amendments of the Constitution by a majority of 2/3 
of votes of all MPs.26
Article 177 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania envisages that the Initiative 
to revise the Constitution may be undertaken by no less than 1/5 of the Members 
of Parliament. Thus it is an exclusivity of the Parliament. The draft is approved by a 
majority of 2/3 of the members of the Parliament, which, in certain cases, may decide 
whether the law on Constitutional revision is to be subjected to referendum or not.
This comparative overview shows the differences between a rigid Constitution and 
a flexible Constitution27. Moreover, it is clear that this issue regard special stricter 
procedures when it comes to revision, and, regardless the differences, all constitutions 
bear some kind of “rigidness” deriving from its characterising role, functions, 
advantage, superiority, and stability.
There are different opinions in the theoretical aspect about the rigidness or flexibility 
of the Constitution and the inclinations towards one of the approaches. Based on 
the theoretical advantages of a rigid constitution, some authors say that nowadays 
the world is dominated by rigid constitutions. Other authors, taking into account the 
flexibility of flexible constitutions, consider it to be more suitable for certain countries, 
especially the ones undergoing transition. However, experience shows that in such 
countries, the priority lies in abiding by the constitution, consolidation of the legal 
framework pursuant to it, and not in the frequent amendment of the Constitution. 
There are many reasons behind it. One of these reasons can be found in the fact that the 
constitutions of such countries are relatively new,28 and they have been drafted on the 
grounds of global democratic traditions, experiences, and achievements, giving them 
the chance to collect and sanction the newest institutes of global constitutionality in 
their constitutions. Legislation in general, including constitutional legislation, follows 
a rational principle, rising and adapting with multidimensional development realities, 
becoming a supporter, voice, and encouragement for such developments, as expressed 
by Edmund Jacoby who stated that “social progress can be achieved only by borrowing 
the testing method from science, thus undertaking pragmatic reforms.”29 Therefore, 
we can say in general that in such constitutions, which reflect long experiences of 
global constitutional democracy, it is still soon to talk about outdated institutes.
Another reason consists in the need to cultivate the equipment of the political class and 
other entities with the necessary constitutional culture so to increase awareness on 
respecting the Constitution and the law, because the inadequate level of such culture 
26 Summary “Constitution,” 1998, pg.134
27 The Albanian Constitution along with the German, Bulgarian, Macedonian, etc. fall under the category of relatively more flexible 
constitutions compared to the constitutions of U.S., Netherlands, Norway, etc., which are characterised as rigid constitutions 
28 E.g. The Constitution of the Republic of Albania has been effective for 15 years and has been revised more than once.
29 Edmund Jacoby: "Best philosophers of all time,"“Spektër” Tirana, 2006, pg.277.
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has often led to the failure to abide by them and has facilitated the preservation of a 
certain mentality which doesn’t look towards the future but only the present. Global 
experience has shown that even during the darkest times and systems of human 
society, the problems and deviations have not derived so much by the laws but mainly 
from abuse and failure to enforce them. In countries with a consolidated democracy, 
Democracy stands before everything, while law and its enforcement comprise the 
main part of democracy. The difference between such countries and those undergoing 
transition comes by the inadequate level of constitutional culture of the political class 
of the countries under transition, which doesn’t have a positive impact in the process 
for the establishment and consolidation of rule of law and in the concept on law, 
which the political class in such countries translates or amends for the interest of 
circumstances or daily politics. There are many examples when countries undergoing 
transition have failed to abide by the constitution.30
Another reason is related to the often unstable political developments which 
characterise such countries, leading to the creation of problems, stalemates, as 
well as crises. In order to bypass such problems, the political class, especially the 
government, tries to find a solution by revising the fundamental document time 
after time, putting the revisions in service of political opportunism and narrow party 
interests. An argument being mentioned in the political spheres of such countries is 
that the votes that give them the majority, also give them the possibility to revise 
the constitution and constitutional institutions for the purpose of their political 
programs. This argument is both wrong and dangerous, as expressed by Tocqueville 
who criticised some aspects of American democracy saying that the governance of a 
majority can be as oppressive as the governance of a despot. If political parties started 
to apply this kind of stance every four years after winning elections, we would have 
a state which is restarted every four years. The Constitution is the very guarantee for 
this not to occur. It is not by chance that in the sphere of countries under transition 
there are displays of reminiscence of strict governance with the risk of return to 
authoritarianism. They have a pluralist and democratic appearance but start to give 
power to just one person, being the prime minister or the head of the state, preparing 
the “democratic” performance also through the use of constitutional revisions, trying 
to centralise the power, affecting the balances between powers so that leaders may 
gain power among the power. Consequently in such countries, the improvement of 
the political constitutional education and culture of the political class becomes and 
indispensability and priority to ensure the necessary stability of the political state 
30 An example of the failure to abide by the constitution is the case of the Parliament of Albania which didn’t respect the 2-3 year 
timeframe from the entry of the Constitution into forceon the regulation of issues related to expropriations and the confiscations 
made before the approval of that Constitution. Concretely, Article 181 obliges the Parliament that within 2-3 years from the 28th 
of November 1998, thus maximum 28 November 2001, to have issued the laws “on the fair regulation of different issues related 
to expropriations and confiscations made before the approval of this constitution, being led by the criteria set forth in Article 41."
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system, as well as to develop and strengthen democracy and rule of law, through 
necessary reforms of a democratic nature.
Revision and revision procedure of the Albanian Constitution of 1998 
Albania’s equipment with a Constitution following the change of systems, meant the 
creation of immovable and stable foundations for the democratic, political, and state 
social system under construction and its future. In 1990, after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, Albania was also involved in the movement for radical change of the system. 
The pluralist system was approved, the Constitution of 1976 was repealed, in absence 
of a constitution the Parliament approved the Main Constitutional Provisions31, and 
efforts started being made to draft and approve a Constitution which would replace 
the provisions. On the 21st of October 1998, the Parliament of Albania approved 
the new Constitution and decided to put it on referendum. It was adopted on the 
28th of November 1998 following approval by referendum on the 22nd of November. 
The Constitution was drafted following a long, fully democratic, politically inclusive 
process and it was supported and assisted step by step by the EC and the Venice 
Commission. It was considered to be in full compliance with European democratic 
standards and beyond. It was a democratic constitution which specified clear balances 
between powers and which prohibited the constitutional possibilities of returning to 
dictatorship models.32It is this very Constitution which enabled the signing of the SAA 
and NATO membership.
As a relatively new Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, basing 
on and benefiting from successful experiences of constitutionalism following the 
2nd World War, includes a special part33 on eventual amendments it may undergo. 
Both the title and content of this part are about partial amendments and not about 
manner of repeal or adoption of a new Constitution. In the meantime, it provides for 
a revision process which is not easy, classifying it in the group of rigid constitutions. 
This is shown by a literal view of Article. According to Article 177&1, the initiative to 
revise the Constitution, as an exclusive prerogative of the Parliament, differently from 
an initiative on another law,34 may be taken by not less than 1/5 of the Members 
of the Parliament. Moreover, paragraph 3 sanctions that in order for the draft to be 
approved it is necessary to have the votes in favour from not less than 2/3 of all MPs, 
which indispensably requires the achievement of a wide consensus35. Furthermore, in 
accordance with point 4, the Parliament may decide with 2/3 of the members that the 
constitutional draft-amendments are put on referendum, which in fact makes it more 
31 Adopted on 29 April 1991
32 For more information see “Constitution and explanatory materials” published by QAKAPP,1998
33 Part 17, entitled “Revision of the Constitution”
34 Article 81 of the Constitution of RA, according to which the right to propose laws belongs to …..each MP….
35 Requires the consent of at least the largest opposition, thus not just an opposition party 
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difficult. However, paragraph 5 specifies that it is mandatory to hold a referendum when 
it is requested by 1/5 of all MPs. This creates favourable opportunity or referendum 
since it gives the possibility of further reflection giving a parliamentary minority the 
right to subject the amendments to the people’s approval. In paragraph 6 of Article 
177, the Constitution sanctions that “The President of the Republic may not return 
for re-consideration a constitutional amendment approved by the Assembly,” while in 
accordance with paragraph 7 “the law approved by referendum shall be promulgated 
by the President of the Republic.” Considering paragraph 6 as an obligation for the 
President to sign the law approved by the Parliament, different authors consider this 
stance to be unfair.36In fact, this paragraph must be considered in two aspects: First, 
the Constitution doesn’t oblige the President to sign the constitutional amendments 
proved by the Parliament, because this paragraph explicitly states that “The President 
of the Republic may not return for re-consideration a constitutional amendment 
approved by the Assembly,” which doesn’t prevent the President from having a stance 
on the law and from refusing to promulgate it.37 And in this case, the law would become 
effective following the expiry of the 20-day timeframe38. Second, like many authors, 
I think that this limitation is legally and logically justified, because in order to repeal 
a presidential decree on the re-consideration of a law, according to Article 85&2, it is 
necessary to have the votes of the majority of all MPs, while the law on constitutional 
amendments is approved by 2/3 of all MPs.
However, regardless of the difficulties envisaged as strengthening measures in the 
revision process, the Constitution of the Republic of Albania has undergone several 
amendments during its 15-year life. The first amendment, which was approved 
unanimously by the Parliament, was made through law No.9675 dated 13 January 
2007.39 On the 21st of April 2008,just a little more than a year after the first amendment, 
the Parliament approved through Law No.9904, a package including important 
substantial amendments which affected 10 articles,40 and for which a dilemma rose 
whether they were a priority conditioned and dictated by the stage of development of 
democracy and rule of law in Albania or not. Following approval in the Parliament and 
entry into force, these amendments41 were accompanied by a wide political and public 
36 Meidani Rexhep, “Constitution: Balance sheet and perspective,”Toena,2009,pg. 54.
37 See Article 84/2of the Constitution 
38 See Article 84/1 of the Constitution 
39 The amendments consisted in the extension of the mandate of local governance bodies from 3 to 4 years and in the increase 
of the number of CEC members from 7 to 9, in the fulfilment of the request for representation of a parliamentary party in the 
Commission. Regarding these amendments, I think that the extension of the mandate of local officials and the recommendation 
of the Venice Commission and the EC Congress of Local and Regional Authorities was logical, while the other amendment was 
unjustified and dictated by conjectural reasons.
40 A. 64,68on the electoral system; part XII “Central Election Commission,” was repealed; A. 65, 67on the start and end of the 
legislature; A. 87,88 on the procedure for the election of the President; A.104,105on confidence and non-confidence motions; A. 
149 on the specification of timeframes in the relation between the Parliament and the General Prosecutor.
41 Debates before the approval of amendments in the Parliament were held only about the electoral system, while no preliminary 
discussion or debate process was held about the other issues.
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debate which is still ongoing. Different opinions were expressed and in certain cases 
the opinions excluded each other.42 Remarks were addressed both on the procedure 
followed as well as on the essence and content of the amendments. The main remark 
on the procedure consists in the unjustified haste, the lack of examination from a 
special committee, the lack of discussions with experts, actors, civil society etc. On the 
contrary, they were addressed as a very common law would have and not like essential 
constitutional amendments. The procedure was against the whole process on the 
drafting and adoption of the Constitution.43 There were and there are still remarks and 
reactions on the content of the amendments, including the change of the electoral 
system, but mainly regarding other spheres. There is this almost widely accepted idea 
that they were dictated mainly by conjectural party interests. The third amendment of 
the constitution was approved through Law No.88/2012, and was related to the issue 
of immunity, as an old internal and international requirement. 
The current stage of the country’s development, the expectations of important reforms, 
like the justice or administrative-territorial reforms, the experience and consequences 
of the constitutional amendments made to date, the issues of the constitutional 
order, as well as the EU accession perspective, represent factors which dictate and 
condition the identification, discussion, and undertaking of necessary amendments to 
the Constitution, with the purpose of improving it in front of the developments and 
challenges in the closure of the prolonged transition period, as well as in the aspect of 
creation of a legal infrastructure to precede Albania’s EU integration process.
Conclusions 
The issue of constitutional amendments for the purpose of imperative reforms in 
the justice sector or the administrative-territorial reform, as well as reforms many 
other sectors which have been proposed during political discussions and beyond, and 
the expectations regarding the EU candidate country status, is sharp and complex, is 
legal and political and social, and it cannot be reduced in just listing the amendments 
42 Two parties, the DP and SP, the consensus of which enabled the amendments, considered the latter (even though after the 
2009 parliamentary elections the SP publicly withdrew from this stance) as a factor which marked the departure of the country 
from electoral deformations, created an anti-crisis environment, built the bases for a stable government; they also considered 
them as the coronation of one of the most responsible processes among the democratic ones for the purpose of consolidating 
the legal state and as a fulfilment of a higher task specified following the invitation to NATO. The majority of other parliamentary 
and non-parliamentary parties from the whole political spectrum did not agree with such considerations. The same thing applies 
to non-party, impartial, professional and intellectual opinions which almost all agreed that the amendments (except for the ones 
on the electoral reform, even though there is room for reflection also here) were not consulted, hasty, non-transparent, non-
indispensable, and that they violated and deformed inter-institutional relations and balances of powers in a modern functional 
democracy.
43 The process for the adoption of the Constitution was a long one; not just when it comes to the time,1992- 1998, but mainly 
because after several versions, the final draft which was drafted after the 1997 parliamentary elections with the assistance of 
experts from European structures, it was subjected to wide discussions in the ad-hoc parliamentary committee as well as in 
roundtables, with participation of legal experts, specialists of different sectors, and civil society. After approval of the Parliament, 
the text of the Constitution was subjected to final adoption by referendum.
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as they were a mere cover of the current constitutional legal order. They represent 
an imperative materialised in well-defined objectives, required and dictated by 
the conditions, circumstances, processes, and challenges of the current and future 
development. This issue is wide, multidimensional dynamic, and very important. The 
debates about this issue, opinions and comments, thoughts and reasoning, awareness 
and viewpoints, and remarks and suggestion may be infinite. As the topic cannot 
be exhausted, this comparative study analysis is aimed at drawing attention on the 
need to approximation, adaptation, and application of western experience in the 
constitutional revision process, which is a very serious matter characterised by the 
need for an optimal amount of time available so to collect and consult the opinions 
of the largest part of the society, as well as by certain rules according to which 
constitutional amendments may not be rendered effective within the mandate of the 
Parliament approving the amendments. In this framework and in the conditions of 
Albania, it would be useful if certain aspects of constitutional amendments, especially 
timeframes, would be approximated with consolidated democratic experience.
The need and requirements to revise the Constitution, even in the less important parts, 
leave alone the important parts as occurred in April of 2008, dictate the specification 
and identification of the main orientations so to reflect the changes of the political and 
state reality in order to influence the further democratic development and development 
of rule of law. This requires serious studies, wide political and public discussions, 
participation of not only political representatives but also experts and professionals 
of law, and especially constitutionalists. In this point of view, the issues addressed and 
many other relevant ones, especially the expected reforms in the justice sector and 
the administrative-territorial one, which have just started to be conceived, as well 
as many others discussed not only by politicians but also many other actors, which 
pose the need for constitutional amendments, require and dictate a process which is 
rigorously specified through a package of amendments which preserve the spirit of 
the Constitution and which guarantee that the Constitution would not be affected as 
many times as political parties clash with each other, so to prevent the creation of a 
serious precedent which would allow political parties to politically “occupy the state” 
and would allow the executive power to have a “privileged” position compared to the 
legislative and judicial power, with attributes to exert their functions.
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